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Against Molinism:
A Refutation of William Lane Craig’s
Molinism
Daniel T. Clemons

The Problem We Face
Why is there pain? This has been one of the major problems to occupy
Christians. In fact, this problem has haunted both Christians and Jews as far back
as the oldest books of the Hebrew canon. One attempt to resolve the problem has
been to postulate that there is some good that may outweigh the evil in the world.
Perhaps it is to God’s glory that evil exists. After all, without evil how could great
goods such as sacrificial love, grace, and mercy, exist?
A common candidate for such a “greater good” has been human freedom.
However, not just any freedom will do. The sort of freedom called for is
libertarian freedom. The kind of freedom that knows no sovereign save the person
to whom it belongs. Traditionally, Christians have thought of God as the being
who created the world “in the beginning” from nothing. Likewise, libertarian
Christians assert that man, in the act of choosing and exercising his will, has an
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analogous creative ability as a byproduct of being made in the image of God.
Many Christians think of this as a great good that could be used to outweigh the
problem of evil. However, some Christians have questioned whether God could
truly be said to be in control of the world, or sovereign in providence, if man’s
freedom to choose limits God’s control.
Is it possible to simultaneously assert God’s sovereign providence over every
detail in creation and man’s freedom, in the libertarian sense, without a
contradiction? The Jesuit theologian, Luis de Molina, thought it was possible.
Several contemporary Molinist philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga, William
Lane Craig, and Thomas P. Flint argue on similar lines. Molinism (named after
Molina) is a theory which poses a plausible scenario to reconcile divine
omniscience and providence with free creaturely choices. In this paper, the
argument will be made that Molinism, specifically Craig’s take on Molinism, is
unnecessary and fails as a reconciliatory theory. First, Molinism is an unnecessary
theory because libertarian freedom, one of Molinism’s starting presuppositions, is
an incoherent concept. Second, Molinism fails as a reconciliatory theory because
libertarian freedom is logically incompatible with the Molinist system itself.

Defining the Terms
Before jumping into the argument of this paper, we will need good working
definitions of the relevant terms. First, with respect to providence, in a radio
broadcasted debate with Paul Helm, William Lane Craig made the following

Quaerens Deum

Spring 2018

Volume 4

Issue 1

Clemons 3

assertion:
The Molinist has this very, very strong sense of divine sovereignty and
meticulous providence…. If [Luis Molina] were living today I [Craig]
think he would say that the tiniest motion of a sub-atomic particle cannot
occur but without God’s direct will or permission. So, this is a very strong
view of divine sovereignty and control.1 (Emphasis mine)
Craig seems to assert, both here and elsewhere, that his definition of providence is
very similar to the Augustinian, Thomist, and Reformed understandings of
providence.2 So now we will examine how this Reformed tradition defines divine
providence. In What About Free Will? the reformed thinker Scott Christensen
defines divine sovereignty in providence as “The biblical doctrine that God
controls time, space, and history. Calvinists usually hold that God meticulously
determines all events that transpire, including human choices.”3 Also, Molinist
philosopher Thomas Flint writes:
Many of the more ardent defenders of providence, from Reformed
thinkers such as Calvin, Leibniz, and Jonathan Edwards to Thomists such
as Domingo Banez and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, clearly belong in
[the Compatibilist traditionalist] camp, while many others, including such
giants as Augustine and Aquinas, might also (though more
controversially) be situated [in the same camp]. Compatibilist
traditionalists insist that God, as first cause, is the ultimate causal
determiner of all that takes place. As compatibilists, such theists insist that
the efficacy of divine decrees is not inconsistent with genuine human
Justin Brierley, “Calvinism vs Molinism,” Premier Christian Radio – Unbelievable?,
recorded January 4, 2014,
<https://www.premierchristianradio.com/shows/Saturday/Unbelievable/episodes/calvinism-vsMolinism-william-lane-craig-paul-helm-unbelievable>.
1

2

For sake of brevity, this Compatibilist tradition will be simply labeled ‘Reformed.’

3

Scott Christensen, What About Free Will?, (P&R Publishing: Phillipsburg, NJ, 2016), 9.
Emphasis mine.
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freedom, for God determines not only the occurrence of events but also
their mode (free or unfree). Many Thomists, for example, have argued that
our actions would indeed be unfree were they the deterministic causal
consequences of prior events, that is, were the type of physical
determinism championed by most contemporary compatibilists true. Yet
God, they insist, can still determine free actions, because no action can
occur without God's concurrent activity. Hence, as the human agent acts
freely, God simultaneously determines its act, thereby safeguarding both
human freedom and divine control.4
Note the insinuation that Thomistic dual-agency is inherently compatibilistic if
God is described as the ultimate cause.
Now to define Libertarian freedom. It seems the great majority of
philosophers consider free will a necessary condition for moral praiseworthiness
and blameworthiness and a theory of freedom that does not account for moral
responsibility can arguably be described as inadequate. Libertarianism is a free
will theory that is supposed to provide a robust sense of moral responsibility for
the free person. Craig himself subscribes to a particular form of libertarian
freedom known as agent-causal libertarianism.5 According to Randolph Clarke
and Justin Capes, under agent-causal libertarianism,
[a]n agent, it is said, is a persisting substance; causation by an agent is
causation by such a substance. Since a substance is not the kind of thing
4

Thomas P. Flint, "Providence," in Blackwell Companions to Philosophy: A Companion
to Philosophy of Religion 2nd ed., ed. Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper, and Philip L. Quinn.
(Blackwell Publishers, 2010). Para 13.
http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?url=https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/bkcphilrel/pr
ovidence/0?institutionId=5072. Emphasis original.
5
Craig affirms the agent-causal view in a Q&A session with Kevin Harris. See William
Lane Craig, “Questions on Molinism, Compatibilism, and Free Will,” Reasonable Faith Podcast,
recorded July 27, 2011, <https://www.reasonablefaith.org/media/reasonable-faithpodcast/questions-on-molinism-compatibilism-and-free-will/>.

Quaerens Deum

Spring 2018

Volume 4

Issue 1

Clemons 5

that can itself be an effect (though various events involving it can be), on
these accounts an agent is in a strict and literal sense an originator of her
free decisions, an uncaused cause of them.6
Note the term “persisting.” I think what is meant here is that this substance has the
power of being in and of itself. Also, note that, according to Clarke and Capes,
being an originator and cause necessitates having this power of being and being
able to impart such being into the choices. J. P. Moreland seems to agree with this
understanding of libertarian freedom as he lists four “basic ideas contained in a
theory of libertarian agency.”7 The first two of these are as follows: “P is a
substance that has the active power to bring about e,” and “P exerted power as a
first mover (an "originator") to bring about e.”8 Here, P represents a person with
libertarian free will and e represents a free action. Likewise, Eleonore Stump in
her essay, “Augustine on Free Will,” described the second of her conditions for
modified libertarianism in this way: “an agent acts with free will, or is morally
responsible for an act, only if her own intellect and will are the sole ultimate
source or first cause of her act.”9
6
Randolph Clarke and Justin Capes, “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of
Free Will,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Spring 2017 Edition),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/incompatibilism-theories/.

J.P. Moreland, “Naturalism and Libertarian Agency,” Philosophy & Theology 10, no. 2
(1997), 353-383.
7

8

Ibid.

9
It is important to note that in footnote seven on page 143 Stump states the following:
“Furthermore, there is a complication which I am leaving to one side here. Insofar as God is the
creator of every created thing and insofar as any created cause is always dependent on the
operation of divine causality, no created thing can ever be the sole cause of anything or the
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God is an agent, the uncaused first cause, and it is in this fact that His
sovereign freedom consists. In agent-causal libertarianism so is every human
being. Human freedom, per this definition, is arguably univocal with divine
freedom.
It is important to note that libertarians are not saying that free humans have
the ability to create on the grand scope to which God can. Certainly, our free
actions do not include things like actualizing universes. I am merely noting that
my free act to take a sip of the coffee that I wish were next to me is one that is
made ex nihilo in the same way that God creates. The difference between the two
instances seems to be one of amount or scope of the ability, not so much a
difference of the type of freedom.
The last thing to be defined is Molinism itself. Luis Molina was a Jesuit and
counter reformer.10 The purpose of Molinism was to soften the blow of the
reformers’ strong doctrine of sovereign providence by reconciling God’s
sovereignty with a Pelagian or Semi-Pelagian understanding of freedom.
Consider the moments (logically) prior to creation. Traditionally, there are

ultimate first cause of anything. What is at issue for Augustine on free will and grace, however, is
whether God is also the cause of the will in some stronger sense than this.” Eleonore Stump,
“Augustine on Free Will,” in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine. eds. Eleonore Stump and
Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Publishers, 2001.), 125.
William L. Craig, “God Directs All Things,” in Four Views on Divine Providence, ed.
Dennis W. Jowers. (Zondervan: Grand Rapids, MI, 2011), 81.
10
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two moments prior to creation.11 The first moment is God’s knowledge of all
logical possibilities or, in other words, possible worlds.12 God’s knowledge of
these truths is traditionally said to be located in God’s nature.13 In a sense, this
moment represents God as being self-aware. Thus, this moment is often called
God’s natural knowledge. From among these logical possibilities, God freely
actualizes a world of His choosing.
God’s knowledge that is contingent upon this process of actualization is called
God’s free knowledge. In order, the moments may appear like something akin to
the following: God has a nature. God has knowledge of His own nature including
all possible worlds He can actualize (natural knowledge). God freely decrees the
actualization of a world according to the possibilities of His own nature. God has
knowledge of His own decree (free knowledge).
The disagreement that Molinism has with the above traditional understanding
of God’s knowledge is that God strongly actualizes all things, meaning He
directly or mediately causes all things to come about.14 If this is so, the Molinist
reasons, then God is the author of evil. The remedy the Molinist attempts to

11

Daniel L. Akin ed., A Theology for the Church (B&H Publishing: Nashville, TN,
2014), 568.
12

William Lane Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (E. J. Brill: Leiden,
The Netherlands, 1991), 237.
13

Ibid.

14

This is contrasted with the Molinist position that God weakly actualizes all things
through free creatures acting in freedom permitting circumstances.
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provide, then, is a third moment before creation. This third moment of divine
knowledge occurs logically posterior to the natural knowledge and logically prior
to the free knowledge. Hence, the name Middle Knowledge.15
Where natural knowledge is all that is logically possible and free Knowledge
is all that God actualizes, middle knowledge is God’s knowledge of all that
libertarian free humans would freely do given certain freedom permitting
circumstances. It is essentially God’s knowledge of true statements in the form “if
this freedom permitting circumstance were the case for this person, then this
person would act freely in this way.” These are commonly called counterfactuals.
In the Molinist system, God bases His free choice to actualize the world on not
only His natural knowledge but also His middle knowledge of what any free
creature would do if he or she were actualized in a particular freedom-permitting
circumstance. In other words, natural knowledge limits the worlds God can
actualize to those that are logically possible, then middle knowledge limits the
logically possible worlds that God can actualize to those that correspond to the
true counterfactuals. (i.e. it is certainly logically possible that I refrain from taking
a sip of my coffee, however that particular counterfactual is not a true one and
thus any possible worlds in which that counterfactual is true are infeasible for
God to actualize.) Thus, God’s options to actualize are limited to the possible

15

William Lane Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom, 237.
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worlds that correspond to the true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.16

The Unnecessary Theory
If Molinism is to be a working reconciliatory theory, two things are necessary.
First, there needs to be a paradox to be reconciled, namely the truth of both
libertarian freedom and the sovereign providence of God in all things. If one of
these two things to be reconciled were not the case, then there would be no need
for Molinism. The second would be the successful reconciliation of the paradox.
In this section, the first of the two necessary conditions will be addressed.
The two assertions to be assumed in Molinism as it pertains to divine
sovereignty are libertarian freedom and the strong Reformed understanding of
divine providence. This section will present arguments to the effect that rational
libertarian freedom is not the case and, therefore, Molinism is unnecessary
because rational behavior is a necessary condition for moral praise and blame.17
Suppose a person (call him John) is at the grocery store and chooses to buy
steak for dinner. Now for a person to be rational or reasonable in choosing, it
seems evident that he must be able to sift through the various options when
choosing and pick his choice according to good reasons. However, willfully

16

William L. Craig, “God Directs All Things,” 82-3.

17
Rational action seems to be a necessary condition for moral praise and blame. When
coming to a verdict concerning a crime this seems very evident. We often find less fault with those
experiencing mental illnesses than with those who rationally act criminally and even lessen
sentences based on claims of temporary insanity.
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arriving at good reasons for the choice made, though necessary, is not a sufficient
condition for rationality. It seems that a person must make choices according to
what appear to be the best available reasons consistently to be considered a
rational person.18 This self-determination may be described as a natural ability,
but not a rational ability to sift through the options freely.19
Why did John choose to buy the steak instead of choosing not to? Here it is
important to distinguish between the subjective reasons for buying the steak, and
the objective reasons for why John bought the steak.20 This distinction is a
variation of C. S. Lewis’ ‘looking at versus looking along’ distinction in
“Meditations in a Toolshed.”21 The subjective reasons will be examined first.
Either John had reasons, or he had no reasons for choosing to buy the steak. If he
had no reasons, then John has acted merely willfully, not rationally. Suppose John
did have reasons. Assuming that John is rational, were the reasons sufficient to

18

Notice, it seems that this description has experience to commend it. When we see a
person acting unreasonably arbitrarily consistently, we typically describe them as insane, though
they seem to retain the ability to sift through the options and make volitional choices.
19
This distinction between natural ability and rational ability to sift through options, is a
reapplication of Jonathan Edwards’ distinction between natural ability to do otherwise and moral
ability to do otherwise. See Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey (Yale:
United States, 2009), 159-60.

Here, by “subjective” I mean to refer to personal motivations. The water is boiling
because I want to make a pot of coffee. By objective I mean the mechanical distinct from personal
motivation. The water is boiling because the electrical energy is converted into heat in the stovecoil which heats the pot containing the water that releases impurities at certain temperatures.
These could be referred to as the why and how a choice is made.
20

C. S. Lewis, “Meditations in a Toolshed,” in God in the Dock, (Eerdmans, Grand
Rapids, MI: 1970), 212-5.
21
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move him to buy the steak? If so, then determinism seems to be the case. If not,
then how are the reasons relevant to his choice?
Suppose that somehow his subjective reasons, although not causal, are still
relevant to his choice. Perhaps one could say they inclined him without causing
him to choose a certain way. But what does the term incline indicate? It indicates
that the person is inclined to choose. Such a situation could no longer be
descriptive of an unmoved mover. Hence, we could not be referring to an agent
here.
Perhaps one may say that John’s reasons are not causal but still relevant
because the reasons are necessary for making the choice and not sufficient. Is
there a sufficient reason for why John chose to buy the steak? Here the objective
reasons are explored. What if John as an agent is sufficient to explain why he
bought the steak? This sounds a great deal like Leibniz’s “complete individual
concept,” which is highly necessitarian.22 What if there were no subjective reason
to buy the steak, and John as an agent is simply sufficient for a choice to be
made? If John were to just choose on the spot without any greater inclination of

Leibniz’ “complete individual concept” is the theory that all complete individuals, such
as Alexander the Great or the coffee mug sitting to my right, are defined by all of their properties
including all relational properties. My mug in order to be my mug is sitting on a particular table,
made with a particular type of wood, which was gathered from a particular forest, which supports
a particular ecosystem at a particular time etc. In sum, all truths of the universe could theoretically
be entailed by my coffee mug. If one of these facts were different, this mug would be a different
mug. But if this were a different mug than this universe would not be the same universe. If it were
the same universe with a different mug, then a contradiction results. Brandon C. Look, "Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2017
Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/leibniz/>.
22
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reasons, then it seems he has forfeited his rationality in that instance. Why? As I
argued above, choosing according to what appear to be the best reasons is
necessary for being a rational or reasonable person. Some have objected that they
have experienced a moment of indifference and have still chosen.23 I must
confess, I am not sure I know what they mean. When given the choice between
two options and unsure of what to pick, I do not choose. On the contrary, I freeze,
often comically, in uncertainty and refer to the advice of others. I know of no
situation where I had absolutely no greater reason for my choice, no matter how
trivial or obvious the reason.
In conclusion, it seems that agent-causal libertarianism cannot answer the
question of why a particular choice is made. Libertarian freedom seems to offer
no rational explanation for why a particular choice is made. Thus, it does not
seem likely that we can praise or blame the person who acts with libertarian
freedom. Therefore, on the above argument Libertarianism is inadequate as a free
will theory and, thus, the paradox necessary for Molinism is not the case.

The Impossible Picture
Assuming that there is a real paradox present, the second step to a working
theory of Molinism is the process of reconciliation itself. In this section, the goal

23
A pertinent question on this objection: assuming I do experience such a libertarian
moment, what reason do I have for thinking the kind of freedom I only seem to experience when
choosing what to eat or which household appliance to purchase is the necessary condition for
being morally culpable?
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will be to show that Craig’s Molinism does not succeed in its attempted
reconciliation by giving two ways in which Craig’s Molinism cannot reconcile
human autonomy and God’s sovereign providence.
First, in “God Directs All Things: On Behalf of a Molinist View of
Providence,” Craig says in a footnote:
In a Molinist scheme, God does not have middle knowledge of how he
himself would freely choose to act in any set of circumstances. For that
would obliterate God’s freedom, since the truth of such so-called
counterfactuals of divine freedom would be prior to and, hence,
independent of God’s decree.24
Furthermore, in Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom, Craig notes that
“Molina believed that [middle knowledge concerning decisions of his own will]
would rob God of his freedom, presumably because which counterfactuals are
true or false does not depend on God’s will.”25
So, what would nullify God’s freedom are counterfactuals that are true
independent of His free actions. One way for counterfactuals to be independent of
free actions is for the counterfactuals to be logically prior to the free actions. But
God’s middle knowledge includes counterfactuals which are logically prior to
and, by Craig’s reasoning, independent of the actual world, including all free
creaturely acts. Therefore, all ‘free’ creatures cannot be free. Therefore, Molinism
fails as a reconciliatory theory.

24

William L. Craig, “God Directs All Things,” 82.

25

William Lane Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom, 238.
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Suppose the Molinist objects to the movement from the divine will to the
creaturely will. After all, there is a great difference between God and man. In
response, the free will is precisely the best topic for such a comparison to take
place. Per the definition given by Clarke and Capes above, agent-causal
libertarianism ascribes the power of being an un-moved mover and creating one’s
choice ex nihilo. This seems univocal to the divine free will. Recall that Flint
seems to insinuate dual-agency would not be an exception to this. If this similarity
between God and men holds, which seems likely, then creaturely freedom would
not be possible within the Molinist framework.
Second, consider God’s middle knowledge of persons prior to actualization.
Craig has suggested that God can know infallibly what any person P will do, just
like Craig could know his wife’s preferred choice of food in a given situation.26
Going back to an earlier example, the thing to see is that there is truth to be
known about John (our steak shopper) logically prior to his existence. This truth is
exhaustive of John’s entire life and all John could possibly be. The actual John is
defined by the pre-actual John and, therefore, the only variation in what John does
or can do is contingent in the circumstance C presented to John. The objection is
that pre-actual John is closely akin to Leibniz’ “complete individual concept”

26
William Lane Craig, “Does God Really Know What I’ll Do in the Future?”,
Reasonable Faith Podcast, recorded on April 30, 2016,
<https://www.reasonablefaith.org/media/reasonable-faith-podcast/does-god-really-know-what-illdo-in-the-future/>.
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described above with the exception that this notion is a hypothetical
circumstantial concept of John as opposed to a set-in-stone concept.
This objection does not rest on causation, for it is not necessary that the
concept of John cause John’s actions. The point is that John’s willing as he does is
necessarily the case in any given circumstance. There seems to be a strong
necessitarianism present in counterfactual statements.

Conclusion
I have argued that one of Craig’s goals is to reconcile libertarian freedom with
a strong sense of divine providence via Molinism, and that the necessary
conditions for the attainment of this goal are that, first, the above paradox
concerning libertarian freedom and a strong sense of divine providence be the
case, and second, that the paradox be successfully reconciled.
With the above two necessary conditions in mind, this paper first argued
against the adequacy of libertarianism. I attempted to show that either the agent
acting with libertarian freedom would be acting irrationally, or that the concept of
an agent willing without any particular reason for doing so would be inexplicable
and therefore incoherent. Thus, the Libertarian theory of freedom seems
inadequate. Second, I argued that libertarian freedom as such would not logically
cohere with Craig’s Molinism. If either of these independent lines of
argumentation is successful, then Craig’s Molinism is refuted.
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